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[W]e could not have fathomed that people with diabetes, epilepsy,
heart conditions, cancer, mental illnesses and other disabilities
would have their ADA claims denied because with medication they
would be considered too functional to meet the definition of
disabled. Nor could we have fathomed a situation where the
individual may be considered too disabled by an employer to get a
job, but not disabled enough by the courts to be protected by the
ADA from discrimination. What a contradictory position that
would have been for the Congress to take.1
Introduction
Congress passed the ADA Amendments Act of 20082 (ADAAA) to address
two issues. First, the ADA’s definition of “disability” had proved to be
© 2010 Jeffrey Douglas Jones
* Associate Professor, Lewis and Clark Law School, Portland, OR; J.D., The University
of Michigan Law School-Ann Arbor; Ph.D. Philosophy, The University of Wisconsin-Madison.
1. ADA Restoration Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 3195 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong.
18 (2007) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 3195] (statement of Steny H. Hoyer, House Majority
Leader).
2. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (amending the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1210112213 (2006))).
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underinclusive. As the epigraph notes, Congress never intended that people
with very serious impairments (e.g., “diabetes, epilepsy, heart conditions,
cancer, mental illnesses”3) would be denied ADA protection simply because
they continued to function much as do people without such impairments.4
Second, ADA litigation had become preoccupied with whether the plaintiffemployee was disabled as opposed to whether the defendant-employer had
engaged in unlawful discrimination.5
The express goal of the ADAAA is “[t]o restore the intent and protections
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.”6 The ADAAA expresses
Congress’s intent “that the primary object of attention in cases brought under
the ADA should be whether entities covered under the ADA have complied
with their obligations, and to convey that the question of whether an
individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand
extensive analysis.”7
But can the ADAAA restore the “intent”—or, more important, the
“protections”—of the ADA simply by tinkering with the ADA’s definition of
“disability”? This article argues that the ADAAA succeeds in strengthening
the ability of ADA plaintiffs to move past disability determinations to the issue
of employer discrimination. The victory, however, comes at a steep price—the
coherence of “disability” as originally understood under the ADA itself.
Part I walks through part of the ADAAA, with commentary on the doctrinal
ramifications of its amendments. From its inception, the ADA has defined
actual “disability” as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more . . . major life activities.”8 The ADAAA maintains the wording
of this definition but significantly alters the meanings of its core concepts,
“substantial limitation” and “major life activity.”9 Specifically, it expands
major life activities to include major bodily functions,10 and it replaces the
Supreme Court’s restrictive interpretation of substantial limitation with a more
flexible inquiry into the difficulties of performing major life activities
experienced by an impaired person compared to those experienced by the
“average” person.11 Moreover, the ADAAA directs that courts not consider
mitigating measures—the use of corrective devices or other steps taken by an
3. Hearing on H.R. 3195, supra note 1, at 18.
4. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(b)(2)-(4), 122 Stat. at 3554.
5. See id. sec. 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. at 3554.
6. Id. at pmbl., 122 Stat. at 3553.
7. Id. sec. 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. at 3554.
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
9. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4(a), § 3, 122 Stat. at 3555-56 (amending 42
U.S.C. § 12102).
10. See id. sec. 4(a), § 3(2)(B), 122 Stat. at 3555.
11. See id. sec. 2(b)(4)-(5), 122 Stat. at 3554.
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individual to reduce the practical effects of an impairment—in evaluating
substantial limitation.12
I argue that the ADAAA’s basic approach to substantial limitation is sound,
but that its expansion of major life activity and elimination of mitigating
measures redress the problem of underinclusiveness at the price of even
greater, and largely counterintuitive, overinclusiveness. The result is that the
new definition of “disability” is largely divorced from whether impairments
experienced by particular individuals are sufficiently limiting to deserve the
designation “disability.” Furthermore, I contend that this result is out of line
with the intent of the original ADA, which the ADAAA purports to “restore.”13
Part II discusses three likely consequences of the ADAAA on employment
law practice. First, under both state and federal law, the ADAAA’s primary
effect on employment law practice will be to redistribute the leverage between
defendant-employers and plaintiff-employees. As discussed below, the win
rates in federal district and appellate courts for Title I ADA plaintiffs have
always been extremely low.14 If applied straightforwardly, the ADAAA will
dramatically reduce the ability of employers to obtain summary judgment on
the issue of existence of disability—previously a major hurdle to plaintiffs in
ADA cases.15 In practice, this means that employers will face greater and
more recurrent pressures to settle cases rather than risk large judgments and
expenses at trial. Second, because many state disability antidiscrimination
laws are modeled after and interpreted in accordance with the ADA, the
ADAAA will likely spur expansion of state-law disability discrimination
protections. Third, because the ADAAA increases the number of conditions
that qualify as disabilities, the employer’s duty to provide reasonable
workplace accommodations will be triggered more frequently.
Ultimately, the ADAAA’s finding that “the question of whether an
individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand
12. See id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(E)(i), 122 Stat. at 3556.
13. See id. at pmbl., 122 Stat. at 3553; see also supra text accompanying note 6.
14. See discussion infra Part II.A. There is much less data on outcomes in state courts than
in federal courts. But the fact that many state disability discrimination laws require
interpretations consistent with the ADA supports the likelihood of results similar to federal
outcomes. See discussion infra Part II.B.
15. See Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L.
R EV . 305, 327-28 (2008). Professor Hoffman hypothesizes that judicial discomfort with
burdening employers led to “courts’ extremely narrow interpretation of the statutory term
‘disability’” under the original ADA. Id. at 327. This narrow interpretation often led courts to
find “that a plaintiff [was] not sufficiently limited to meet the ‘substantially limits’ requirement
or that the constraint in question affect[ed] a narrow area of functionality but not a ‘major life’
activity.” Id. “Consequently, plaintiffs encounter[ed] significant difficulty convincing the
courts that they [were] entitled to ADA coverage by virtue of having a ‘disability’” Id. at 328.
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extensive analysis”16 translates into a default rule for courts to follow: when
disability determinations are close, courts should ignore doctrine and give
plaintiffs a pass (rather than crafting judicial tests, as in the Sutton case17).
This opens the door to a multitude of conditions that may receive a pass,
depriving employers of any meaningful chance of obtaining summary
judgment on the basis that particular employees are not legally disabled.
Furthermore, it means that employees who are in no way disabled, but who
have a noted physical or mental impairment and also have experienced some
kind of adverse employment action, may be able to force employers to the
bargaining table. This will increase the win rate of plaintiffs in ADA Title I
cases, but there remains a serious question whether Congress intended the
ADA to protect these kinds of individuals in the first place.
I. “Disability” After the ADA Amendments Act
The focus of this article is not the ADA or, for that matter, the ADAAA
generally. The focus, rather, is on the doctrinal coherence of the ADAAA’s
amended definition of “disability” and its impact on ADA litigation.18 An
employee who wants to bring a disability discrimination claim under the ADA
must first prove that he or she is an individual with a disability.19 The ADA,
originally and as amended by the ADAAA, establishes a three-prong definition
of disability: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record of such an
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”20 The
reforms of the ADAAA pertain primarily to the first prong—which I have

16. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. at 3554; see also supra text
accompanying note 7.
17. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999) (describing the
disability determination as one involving an “individualized inquiry” into whether a particular
plaintiff’s impairment presently causes substantial limitation of a major life activity, taking into
account the effect of mitigating measures on the impairment), superseded by statute, ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(b)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. at 3554.
18. For background and other information on the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
see generally RUTH C OLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2005); EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000); JOHN PARRY, DISABILITY
DISCRIMINATION LAW, EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY (2008); J OHN PARRY, HANDBOOK ON
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION LAW (2003).
19. See, e.g., Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist. 197 F.3d 804, 810 (6th Cir. 1999).
20. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006), with ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4(a),
§ 3(1), 122 Stat. at 3555.
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termed “actual disability.” Therefore, the remainder of this article focuses on
actual disability.21
The ADA’s definition of actual disability pyramids, with the major life
activity and substantial limitation requirements acting as “statutory filters
distinguishing those suffering from relatively serious impairments from those
with ‘minor, trivial impairment[s].’”22 This section treats physical or mental
impairment, major life activity, and substantial limitation in turn. The gist of
the argument is this: While the ADAAA makes no change to physical or
mental impairment, it radically expands the scope of major life activity and
dramatically lowers the threshold of substantial limitation. The result is that
far more individuals with physical or mental impairments—even ones that
would have been considered trivial pre-ADAAA—will be able to prove that
they are substantially limited in the ability to perform a major life activity,
thereby qualifying as disabled.
A. Physical or Mental Impairment
The ADAAA “does not . . . [define] the terms ‘physical impairment’ or
‘mental impairment.’”23 Rather, the House “Committee [on Education and
Labor] expect[ed] that the current regulatory definition of such terms, as
promulgated by agencies such as the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity

21. The ADAAA makes no changes to the second prong—“record of” disability—and
makes only a straightforward, but substantial, change to the third prong—“regarded as”
disability. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2), with ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4, § 3(1),
(3), 122 Stat. at 3555. With respect to “regarded as” disability, the ADAAA clarifies that an
employee may be regarded as disabled “whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived
to limit a major life activity.” ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(A), 122 Stat.
at 3555. Yet the definition of “regarded as” disability is not without limitation, because it does
“not apply to impairments that are transitory and minor. A transitory impairment is an
impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.” Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(3)(B),
122 Stat. at 3555.
22. Adams v. Rice, 531 F.3d 936, 944 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (1990)). The broader passage cited by the court reads,
A person with a minor, trivial impairment, such as a simple infected finger is not
impaired in a major life activity. A person is considered an individual with a
disability for purposes of the first prong of the definition when the individual’s
important life activities are restricted as to the conditions, manner, or duration
under which they can be performed in comparison to most people. A person who
can walk for 10 miles continuously is not substantially limited in walking merely
because on the eleventh mile, he or she begins to experience pain because most
people would not be able to walk eleven miles without experiencing some
discomfort.
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52.
23. H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 9 (2008).
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Commission (EEOC) . . . [would] not change.”24 Consequently, this section
briefly summarizes the law relating to physical and mental impairment under
the ADA.
The EEOC defines “physical or mental impairment” as follows:
(1) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the
following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special
sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular,
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin,
and endocrine; or
(2) Any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness,
and specific learning disabilities.25
This expansive definition of “physical or mental impairment” appears to
encompass nearly any human dysfunction that is not expressly excluded from
ADA coverage as a nonimpairment.26 Among the EEOC’s express exclusions
from the category of impairment are illegal drug use, homosexuality, and
bisexuality.27
EEOC regulations also exclude three other types of “disorders”: “(1)
Transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender
identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual
behavior disorders; (2) Compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania;
[and] (3) Psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal
use of drugs.”28 The EEOC points to further exclusions in its regulatory
appendix:
[T]he term “impairment” does not include physical characteristics
such as eye color, hair color, left-handedness, or height, weight or
muscle tone that are within “normal” range and are not the result of

24. Id.
25. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2008).
26. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (“It is not possible to include in the legislation
a list of all the specific conditions, diseases, or infections that would constitute physical or
mental impairments because of the difficulty of ensuring the comprehensiveness of such a list,
particularly in light of the fact that new disorders may develop in the future. The term includes,
however, such conditions, diseases and infections as: orthopedic, visual, speech, and hearing
impairments, cerebral palsy, epilepsy, muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, infection with the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus, cancer, heart disease, diabetes, mental retardation, emotional
illness, specific learning disabilities, drug addiction, and alcoholism.”).
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3(a), (e).
28. Id. § 1630.3(d).
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a physiological disorder[;] . . . characteristic predisposition to
illness or disease[;] . . . conditions, such as pregnancy, that are not
the result of a physiological disorder[;] . . . common personality
traits such as poor judgment or a quick temper where these are not
symptoms of a mental or psychological disorder[;] [e]nvironmental,
cultural, or economic disadvantages such as poverty, lack of
education or a prison record . . . [;] [and] [a]dvanced age, in and of
itself . . . .29
Because the ADA means to capture the widest possible scope of human
dysfunction not statutorily excluded,30 the existence of physical or mental
impairment has not been a source of much litigation. Unless an employer has
reason to suspect that an employee is faking dysfunction, it is difficult to
conceive of any legal advantage gained by contending that an employee with
a muscle sprain, a cold, vertigo, a backache, recurring headaches, anxiety, a
limp, less than 20/20 vision, claustrophobia, a skin rash, stress, glandular
complications, etc., is not, in fact, impaired.31
B. The New Major Life Activity of “Normal Functioning”32
In order for a physical or mental impairment to qualify as a disability under
the ADA, the impairment must affect one or more major life activities.33 This
requirement is one statutory filter that is supposed to distinguish legal
29. Id. § 1630.2(h) app.
30. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51-52.
31. Following the regulatory framework for “physical or mental impairment” summarized
above, the rare findings against the existence of impairment are made on the basis that a
plaintiff-employee’s alleged dysfunction is actually a condition or characteristic rather than an
impairment. See, e.g., Mehr v. Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc., 72 F. App’x 276,
286-87 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that short stature that is not the result of a physiological disorder
is not an impairment); Watson v. City of Miami Beach, 177 F.3d 932, 935 (11th Cir. 1999)
(concluding that an employee described as “paranoid, disgruntled, oppositional, difficult to
interact with, unusual, suspicious, threatening, and distrustful” suffers from behavioral
problems, not mental impairments (internal quotation marks omitted)); Duda v. Bd. of Educ.,
133 F.3d 1054, 1059 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that “mere temperament and irritability” are not
impairments); Lucas v. K.O.A. Residential Cmty., No. 2:06CV992 DAK, 2008 WL 80407, at
*3 (D. Utah Jan. 4, 2008) (holding that neither homelessness nor poverty qualifies as a physical
or mental impairment); Greenberg v. New York, 919 F. Supp. 637, 643 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(finding that poor judgment is a personality trait, not an impairment); Gerben v. Holsclaw, 692
F. Supp. 557, 563-64 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (concluding that infancy is not a physical or mental
impairment).
32. This section and the next are indebted to Professor Ani B. Satz’s article, A
Jurisprudence of Dysfunction: On the Role of “Normal Species Functioning” in Disability
Analysis, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 221 (2006).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006).
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disabilities from “minor, trivial impairment[s].”34
In Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, the U.S. Supreme Court defined
“major life activities” as “activities that are of central importance to daily
life.”35
The EEOC regulations provide a nonexhaustive list of major life activities
that includes “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing,
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, . . . working, . . . sitting, standing,
lifting, [and] reaching.”36 The EEOC’s Compliance Manual even lists “mental
and emotional processes such as thinking, concentrating, and interacting with
others . . . [as] major life activities.”37 Courts have liberally added to the list
of major life activities, which now includes, among other things, cognitive
functions, waste elimination, eating, sleeping, reading and writing, sexual
activity, and reproduction.38
It remains the case, however, that not every activity qualifies as “major”
under the ADA, as construed by the courts.39 Additionally, despite broad
34. See Adams v. Rice, 531 F.3d 936, 944 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting
H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52).
35. 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.
L. No. 110-325, sec. 2(b)(4)-(5), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554.
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) app. (2008).
37. EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 902.3(b) (1995), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
policy/docs/902cm.pdf. According to David K. Fram, the EEOC has also advocated in amicus
briefs to include the following within the definition of “major life activity”: “ordinary household
activities (such as changing car tires, moving furniture and other household items often
associated with maintaining a home and raising children)”; “moving (including bending,
twisting, stooping, or squatting)”; maintaining proper nutrition (defined as “one’s ability to
assimilate food and use it for growth and maintenance”); perceiving depth (as opposed to
merely seeing); sleeping; “eliminating waste”; and having the “ability to control basic bodily
functions, specifically one’s bowels.” DAVID K. FRAM, RESOLVING ADA WORKPLACE
QUESTIONS: HOW COURTS AND AGENCIES ARE DEALING WITH EMPLOYMENT ISSUES I-6 (22d
ed. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639 (1998) (reproduction); Adams, 531 F.3d
at 947 (engaging in sexual relations); Wilson v. Phoenix Specialty Mfg. Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 378,
385-86 (4th Cir. 2008) (seeing and writing); Battle v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 438 F.3d 856,
861-62 (8th Cir. 2006) (thinking and concentrating); Heiko v. Colombo Sav. Bank, 434 F.3d
249, 255 (4th Cir. 2006) (eliminating bodily waste); Head v. Glacier Nw., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053,
1062 (9th Cir. 2005) (reading); Fiscus v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 385 F.3d 378, 384 (3d Cir.
2004) (eliminating waste from the blood); Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1040 (9th Cir.
2003) (eating); Gagliardo v. Connaught Labs., Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 569 (3d Cir. 2002)
(concentrating and remembering); Brown v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 286 F.3d 1040, 1044-45
(8th Cir. 2002) (carrying out cognitive functions).
39. See, e.g., Storey v. City of Chicago, 263 F. App’x 511, 514 (7th Cir. 2008) (cooking);
Singh v. George Washington Univ. Sch. of Med. & Health Scis., 508 F.3d 1097, 1104 (D.C.
Cir. 2007) (test taking); Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 998, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2007)
(localizing sound); Gretillat v. Care Initiatives, 481 F.3d 649, 654 (8th Cir. 2007) (crawling,
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findings of major life activity by the EEOC and courts, the same activity may
qualify as major in some cases but not others. For example, while courts have
held that reading is generally a major life activity,40 in Szmaj v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co., the Seventh Circuit held that “the ability to read
all day long is not a major life activity.”41 Judge Posner, writing for the panel,
added that the situation might be different if America were “a society of
bookworms.”42 Similarly, in Marinelli v. City of Erie, the Third Circuit held
that cleaning is only “a major life activity to the extent that . . . [it] is necessary
for one to live in a healthy or sanitary environment.”43
The ADAAA makes two changes regarding major life activity. First, it
codifies the EEOC’s updated sample list of major life activities, with the
addition of activities that courts have routinely recognized as major life
activities.44 Second, and more important, it adds “major bodily functions” as
major life activities: “[A] major life activity also includes the operation of a
major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune
system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain,
respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.”45
The addition of major bodily functions to the ADAAA’s definition of
“major life activity” was in response to cases like Furnish v. SVI Systems,
Inc.46 Plaintiff Furnish was director of technical operations for defendant SVI

kneeling, crouching, squatting); EEOC v. Schneider Nat’l, Inc., 481 F.3d 507, 511 (7th Cir.
2007) (truck driving); Rossbach v. City of Miami, 371 F.3d 1354, 1358 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004)
(weight lifting, playing in parks, participating in sports); McGeshick v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1146,
1150-51 (10th Cir. 2004) (working on ladders, in stairwells, and on ledges to clean windows);
Boerst v. Gen. Mills Operations, Inc., 25 F. App’x 403, 406 (6th Cir. 2002) (concentrating,
maintaining stamina); Moore v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 221 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 2000)
(bowling, camping, car restoration, lawn mowing); Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 914
(8th Cir. 1999) (shoveling, gardening, lawn mowing, playing tennis, fishing, hiking); Colwell
v. Suffolk County Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 643 (2d Cir. 1998) (shopping, skiing, golfing,
painting, plastering); Robinson v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 101 F.3d 35, 37 (5th Cir. 1996)
(climbing stairs); Thompson v. Rice, 422 F. Supp. 2d 158, 171 (D.D.C. 2006) (working abroad);
Piascyk v. City of New Haven, 64 F. Supp. 2d 19, 26 (D. Conn. 1999) (running, jumping).
40. See, e.g., Head, 413 F.3d at 1062.
41. 291 F.3d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 2002).
42. Id.
43. 216 F.3d 354, 362-63 (3d Cir. 2000).
44. The nonexhaustive list of major life activities now includes the following: “caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting,
bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and
working.” ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 4(a), § 3(2)(A), 122 Stat.
3553, 3555 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)).
45. Id. sec. 4(a), § 3(2)(B), 122 Stat. at 3555 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)).
46. 270 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2001), cited in H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 17 (2008).
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Systems.47 Furnish was “responsible for pre-installation technical work and
for installing SVI’s video systems in hotels,” which required regular travel.48
In August 1995, Furnish was diagnosed with Hepatitis B and septal fibrosis,
which affected his liver’s ability to eliminate toxins and maintain proper
glucose levels.49 In January 1996, Furnish informed his supervisor that the
disease and the prescribed medications would require him to miss work in the
coming months.50 Furnish also told his employer of possible side-effects of
the medication, which included sleep loss, mood swings, and flu-like
symptoms.51 In March 1996, Furnish told his supervisor that, due to his
condition, he was no longer able to travel long distances for installation jobs.52
Soon thereafter, Furnish missed an installation job “because he had vomited
and had to go home to rest.”53 By June 1996, Furnish was behind on his
installation schedule.54 As a result, Furnish’s supervisor relieved him of his
former installation duties and limited him to preinstallation work.55 SVI
terminated Furnish less than a month later for “unsatisfactory work
performance.”56
Furnish filed suit under the ADA, but the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of SVI because Furnish’s “disease did not substantially limit
a major life activity.”57 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.58 In
explaining why liver function was not a major life activity, the court first
observed that “‘liver function’ bears little resemblance to the major life
activities enunciated in the ADA regulations,”59 namely, “caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working.”60 The Seventh Circuit then turned to Supreme Court
jurisprudence on major life activity, which instructed that the activity must be
“integral to one’s daily existence.”61 Applying this principle to Furnish’s case,
the Seventh Circuit distinguished between the characteristics of an impairment
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 446.
Id. at 446-47.
Id. at 447.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 449.
Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2001)).
Id. (quoting Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916, 923 (7th Cir. 2001)).
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and activities that are impacted because of an impairment.62 It held that
diminished liver function was a characteristic of Hepatitis B–induced liver
fibrosis and not an activity in its own right, major or otherwise.63
According to the House Committee on Education and Labor (the
Committee), the addition of “major bodily functions” to the definition of
“major life activities” “was needed to ensure that the impact of an impairment
on the operation of major bodily functions is not overlooked or wrongly
dismissed as falling outside the definition of ‘major life activities’ under the
ADA,”64 as the Committee claimed had happened in Furnish.65 The
Committee further explained that “[a]n impairment can materially restrict the
operation of a major bodily function if it causes the operation to over-produce
or under-produce in some harmful fashion.”66
The Committee described the addition of major bodily functions as a
“clarification” rather than an expansion of the scope of major life activities.67
But it is much more. In fact, the addition radically changes the definition of
“disability” under the ADA. Now, in many cases, the symptoms, side effects,
or other manifestations of a physical impairment will themselves qualify as
major life activities. This, I will show, effectively merges what, before the
ADAAA, were separate inquiries into the existence of physical or mental
impairment and impact on major life activity.68 In short, because part of what
it means to suffer certain physical impairments is to be substantially limited in
having normal bodily functions,69 a person suffering from an impairment such
as liver fibrosis (like the plaintiff in Furnish) is necessarily “disabled” under
the ADAAA since that person is substantially limited in the major life activity
of having a normally functioning liver.
The ADAAA’s rationale for treating individuals like Furnish as
substantially limited in a major life activity is not merely an extension of
preexisting ADA doctrine. Rather, it represents a whole new theory of
disability—deviation from the major life activity of normal functioning. As
used here, “normal functioning” is an umbrella term under which any bodily
function can be stuffed. Under the umbrella, medical documentation of
deviate functioning created by an impairment will, alone, prove sufficient to
62. Id. at 450.
63. See id.
64. H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 16 (2008).
65. See id. at 17.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 16-17.
68. See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
69. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 4(a), § 3(2)(B), 122 Stat.
3553, 3555 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)).
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establish disability. On its face, linking physical or mental impairment with
major bodily function is much easier than linking physical or mental
impairment to traditional major life activities. For example, it is likely easier
to show that a physical impairment (e.g., asthma) affects the normal operation
of one’s circulatory or respiratory system than it is to show that the same
impairment limits the major life activity of walking. Similarly, it should be
easier to prove that an impairment (e.g., chronic acid reflux) affects the normal
operation of one’s digestive system than it is to show that the impairment
limits the major life activity of eating. This is probably what Congress
intended with the ADAAA’s addition of major bodily functions to the list of
major life activities.
But the impairment–major bodily function link created by the ADAAA runs
counter to the ADA’s stated goals. Those goals are “to assure equality of
opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic selfsufficiency” for people with disabilities.70 There is a reason why the ADA has
always required substantial limitation on a major life activity in addition to a
mere physical or mental impairment for a person to qualify as disabled.71 The
former requirements connect the importance of personal action and interaction
with the aforementioned goals of the ADA. The ADA does not protect
individuals with substantially limiting physical and mental impairments in
everything they are doing or might choose to do, as evidenced by the fact that
not everything qualifies as a major life activity.72 Rather, at least until passage
of the ADAAA, major life activities were limited to those “of central
importance to daily life,”73 or “those basic activities that the average person in
the general population can perform with little or no difficulty.”74
In linking impairment with major bodily function, the ADAAA confuses
two ideas. It confuses the ADA’s concern for particular outcomes—“equality
of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic selfsufficiency” for people with disabilities75—with a concern that persons with
70. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2006). The Findings and Purposes section of the ADAAA
reiterates these goals. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(a)(2), 122 Stat. at 3553.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); see also supra text accompanying note 8.
72. See, e.g., Gretillat v. Care Initiatives, 481 F.3d 649, 654 (8th Cir. 2007) (excluding
crawling, kneeling, crouching, and squatting from the category of major life activities); Holt v.
Grand Lake Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 443 F.3d 762, 767 (10th Cir. 2006) (excluding chewing
and swallowing from the category of major life activities); Marinelli v. City of Erie, 216 F.3d
354, 362-63 (3d Cir. 2000) (excluding cleaning and doing housework from the category of
major life activities).
73. See Kania v. Potter, No. 09-1326, 2009 WL 4918013, at *3 (3d Cir. Dec. 22, 2009)
(quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002)).
74. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) app. (2008).
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8); see also supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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disabilities function normally.76 Professor Satz observes that in thinking about
normal species functions, we may be concerned about one of three different
“categories of actions”: “standardizing biological states, promoting familiar
modes of functioning, [or] striving for particular outcomes.”77
Standardizing biological states involves accommodations that allow
individuals to function in biologically similar ways to other
individuals. In other words, the mode of functioning is emphasized
over the result of functioning. . . . Promoting familiar or normal
modes of functioning entails accommodations that allow
individuals to execute functions in ways that are most familiar,
while not necessarily involving biological standardization.78
According to Professor Satz, both of these categories of actions “emphasize a
manner or mode of functioning . . . rather than functional outcomes.”79 The
ADAAA’s impairment–major bodily function link exemplifies just this kind
of error, because it focuses on standardizing biological states instead of
alternative modes of functioning that may result in outcomes consistent with
the stated goals of the ADA.
Return to Furnish. A person who suffers liver fibrosis, as Furnish did,80
presumably has a liver that is not functioning normally. Such a person has a
condition that affects the major bodily function of toxin elimination.81 But
there is no necessary connection between that condition and those activities
“of central importance to daily life”82 or “those basic activities that the average
person in the general population can perform with little or no difficulty.”83 A
full examination of Furnish’s life might reveal that he can still walk, talk, see,
care for himself, perform manual tasks, go on vacation, play sports, etc. That
is, the particular state of Furnish’s liver might not at all affect basic, daily
activities. Of course, we can imagine a circumstance where Furnish’s liver
76. See Satz, supra note 32, at 241-43.
77. See id. at 241 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Ani B. Satz & Anita Silvers,
Disability and Biotechnology, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY 173, 183 (Thomas J. Murray & Maxwell J. Mehlman eds., 2000)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 241-42.
80. See Furnish v. SVI Sys., Inc., 270 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2001); see also supra text
accompanying note 49.
81. See Furnish, 270 F.3d at 447 (noting that liver fibrosis “affects the liver’s ability to
perform its blood filtering function”).
82. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002); see also supra
text accompanying note 73.
83. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) app. (2008) (emphasis added); see also supra text accompanying
note 74.
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functioned so poorly that it did, in fact, have such an impact, but this is not a
foregone or necessary conclusion. Yet the ADAAA omits this inquiry
altogether, and instead accepts abnormal bodily function of any degree, no
matter how minor, as categorical proof of effect on major life activity.
If Congress believed that cases like Furnish were wrongly decided, there
was another, more coherent legislative solution that it could have adopted.
The ADAAA’s reinstatement of a broad view of disability and its call for the
EEOC to craft a more relaxed standard for disability determinations created
room for a different outcome in the Furnish case.84 Rather than extending
major life activities to cover bodily functions, Congress could have expanded
the list of major life activities to expressly include the kinds of daily
restrictions that Furnish actually faced (loss of “sleep, nausea, mood
swings, . . . irritability[,] . . . [and] flu-like symptoms”).85 This course of action
would have lowered the threshold for establishing existence of disability in a
manner that would have preserved the traditional link between impairment and
major life activity, and so between disability and the goals of the ADA.
Nevertheless, Congress ultimately opted for a different approach in the
ADAAA. The Act partially collapses major life activity into physical and
mental impairment by including major bodily functions in the definition of
“major life activities.”86 Although this unquestionably lowers the threshold for
proving existence of disability, it does so only by making the definition of
“disability” less coherent.
C. Redefining “Substantial Limitation”
Before passage of the ADAAA, “substantially limits” had the following
meaning:
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular major
life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration

84. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 2(b), 122 Stat. 3553,
3554. The “broad view of disability” mentioned here refers to the scope of “disability” as
discussed throughout School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987). The
ADAAA explicitly states an intention to reinstate this broad view. ADA Amendments Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 2(b)(3), 122 Stat. at 3554.
85. See Furnish, 270 F.3d at 447; see also supra text accompanying note 51.
86. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4(a), § 3(2)(B), 122 Stat. at 3555 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)).
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under which the average person in the general population can
perform that same major life activity.87
In Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, the U.S. Supreme
Court interpreted “substantially” to mean “considerable” or “to a large degree”
and reasoned that the term needed “to be interpreted strictly to create a
demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.”88 The Court went on to hold
that “to be substantially limited in [a major life activity], an individual must
have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from
doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives.”89
The ADAAA expressly rejects the “severely restricts” standard announced
in Toyota because that standard requires “a greater degree of limitation than
was intended by Congress.”90 In debating Senate Bill 3406, the Senate version
of the ADAAA that became law, the Senate deliberated extensively about
whether a new term should be used in the ADAAA in place of “substantially
limits.”91 The Senate decided against a new term, reasoning that “[t]he
resulting need for further judicial scrutiny and construction [would] not help
move the focus from the threshold issue of disability to the primary issue of
discrimination.”92 Instead, the Senate reaffirmed that the proper question is
“whether a person’s activities are limited in condition, duration and manner.”93
It was careful to note, however, that courts must apply a lower standard than
Toyota in order to “make the disability determination an appropriate threshold

87. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1).
88. 534 U.S. 184, 196-97 (2002).
89. Id. at 198.
90. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 2(a)(7), (b)(4), 122 Stat. at 3553-54.
91. See 154 CONG. REC. S8840, S8841 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) (Statement of Managers).
House Bill 3195, the House version of the ADAAA, would have clarified the meaning of
“substantially limits” for the EEOC and courts by adding the phrase “materially restricts”:
While the limitation imposed by an impairment must be important, it need not rise
to the level of severely restricting or significantly restricting the ability to perform
a major life activity in order to qualify as a disability. In the range of severity of
the limitation, “materially restricted” is meant to be less than a severe or
significant limitation and more than a moderate limitation, as opposed to a minor
limitation. The level of the restriction created by the impairment must be the
determining factor—not the severity of the impairment itself. For example, an
individual with mild mental retardation (intellectual disability) would be
considered materially restricted in the major life activities of learning and
thinking. Multiple impairments that combine to materially restrict a major life
activity also constitute a disability.
H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 9-10 (2008).
92. 154 CONG. REC. at S8841.
93. Id. at S8842.
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issue but not an onerous burden for those seeking accommodations or
modifications.”94
In addition to discarding the Supreme Court’s restrictive interpretation of
“substantially limits,” the ADAAA makes another important change regarding
substantial limitation. It prohibits considering “the ameliorative effects of
mitigating measures” when determining “whether an [individual’s] impairment
substantially limits a major life activity.”95 In theory, this provision removes
the “penalty” of being less eligible for protection under the ADA by virtue of
receiving accommodations or adopting adaptive strategies that lessen the
harmful effects of a disability.96
According to the Senate, “[S]ome individuals previously found not disabled
will now be able to claim the ADA’s protection against discrimination” as a
result of the above two changes.97 But who are these newly protected
individuals, and should they be protected? Recall that the ADAAA was passed
to expand the ADA’s coverage to more people with serious impairments and
to focus attention on the issue of employer compliance.98 The changes to the
meaning of “substantial limitation” are the central tools of this strategy. In the
next two subsections, however, I argue that the ADAAA’s alterations to
substantial limitation get the issue half right. On the one hand, the ADAAA’s
less restrictive understanding of “substantial limitation” is a sound strategy for
correcting the problem of underinclusiveness. On the other hand, the nearwholesale rejection of mitigating measures undermines the logical consistency
and common sense of the ADA, and it opens the door to protection of many
people who should not qualify as disabled.
1. The Proper Measure of Substantial Limitation
Courts have taken at least two approaches to measuring substantial
limitation. First, some courts have measured substantial limitation in terms of
the severity of an individual’s impairment. A good example of this approach
94. Id.
95. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(E)(i), 122 Stat. at 3556 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)). In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., the Supreme Court ruled that
the effect of mitigating measures must be taken into account when determining whether a
person is disabled. See 527 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments
Act of 2008, sec. 2(b)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. at 3554.
96. 154 CONG. REC. at S8842 (“[A]n individual with an impairment that substantially limits
a major life activity should not be penalized when seeking protection under the ADA simply
because he or she managed their [sic] own adaptive strategies or received [informal or
undocumented] accommodations . . . that have the effect of lessening the deleterious impacts
of their [sic] disability.”)
97. Id.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 2-7.
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may be found in Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.99 The plaintiff in Littleton
was a twenty-nine-year-old man who suffered mental retardation.100 Although
Littleton graduated from high school, because of his disability he lived with
his mother and received social security benefits.101 Littleton applied for a job
as a cart pusher with Wal-Mart through an Alabama state employment
agency.102 According to Littleton, he requested to bring the state employment
coordinator to his interview, but Wal-Mart ultimately denied this request.103
Littleton’s interview went poorly, and Wal-Mart did not offer him a
position.104
Littleton sued Wal-Mart under the ADA, claiming to be “substantially
limited in the major life activities of learning, thinking, [and] communicating,”
among others.105 The district court granted summary judgment to Wal-Mart,
finding that Littleton was not substantially limited in any major life
activities.106 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed after noting that Littleton could
read, drive a car, and communicate effectively with words.107 The circuit court
indicated that the analysis of substantial limitation should focus on the severity
of the plaintiff’s impairments—in this case, how severe Littleton’s
impairments were in relation to major life activities that most people
perform.108 Since Littleton could (to a significant degree) do many of the
major life activities that nondisabled people can, the court found that, for
purposes of summary judgment, he had failed to establish that he was
substantially limited in any major life activities.109
Other courts have measured substantial limitation, not in terms of severity
of impairment, but rather in terms of level of restriction. Price v. National
Board of Medical Examiners exemplifies this approach.110 Price, Singleton,
and Morris were medical students with diagnosed learning disorders.111
Although they requested special testing accommodations, their medical school
denied the requests after determining that none of the plaintiffs was
substantially limited in the major life activity of learning as a result of his
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See 231 F. App’x 874 (11th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 875.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 876.
Id. at 876-77.
Id. at 877-78.
See id. at 877.
See id. at 877-78.
See 966 F. Supp. 419 (S.D. W. Va. 1997).
Id. at 422.
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impairment.112 Mr. Price finished high school with a 3.4 grade point average,
and finished college with a 2.9 grade point average.113 There was little
evidence that Price had ever been substantially limited in “home, school, or
work functioning,” although he had received testing accommodations for the
Medical College Admission Test.114
Mr. Singleton finished high school with a weighted grade point average of
4.2 and won a state debate championship.115 He attended the U.S. Naval
Academy, later graduated with a physics degree from Vanderbilt, and gained
admission to medical school.116 Singleton accomplished all of this “without
any accommodation for his alleged disability.”117
Mr. Morris was an honor student in high school and earned average grades
as a student at Virginia Military Institute, where he received his undergraduate
degree.118 Morris’s medical school prerequisites, which he completed at
another institution, reflected a grade point average of 3.5.119 Morris
accomplished all of this—and eventually gained admission to medical
school—without any accommodation for his disability.120
The district court held that the plaintiffs were not substantially limited in the
major life activity of learning.121 In explaining its holding, the court gave the
following hypothetical:
Take, for example, two hypothetical students. Student A has
average intellectual capability and an impairment (dyslexia) that
limits his ability to learn so that he can only learn as well as ten
percent of the population. His ability to learn is substantially
impaired because it is limited in comparison to most people.
Therefore, Student A has a disability for purposes of the ADA. By
contrast, Student B has superior intellectual capability, but her
impairment (dyslexia) limits her ability so that she can learn as well
as the average person. Her dyslexia qualifies as an impairment.
However, Student B’s impairment does not substantially limit the
major life function of learning, because it does not restrict her

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 422, 424.
Id. at 423.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 424.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 427-28.
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ability to learn as compared with most people. Therefore, Student
B is not a person with a disability for purposes of the ADA.122
According to the Price court, then, the determination of substantial limitation
turns on whether an impairment restricts a person’s ability to perform at the
level of an average person, as opposed to the severity of the impairment in and
of itself.123
One virtue of the ADAAA is that it resolves that the proper measure of
substantial limitation is level of restriction (Price), not severity of impairment
(Littleton).124 The ADAAA’s formal adoption of level of restriction as the
proper measure of substantial limitation comports with much prior ADA
policy. For instance, the Senate maintains that after the ADAAA it will remain
true that “[a] person who can walk for 10 miles continuously is not
substantially limited in walking merely because on the eleventh mile, he or she
begins to experience pain because most people would not be able to walk
eleven miles without experiencing some discomfort.”125 Similarly, the EEOC
has long taken the position that
an individual who had once been able to walk at an extraordinary
speed would not be substantially limited in the major life activity
122. Id. at 427.
123. See id. at 426-28.
124. The Report on House Bill 3195 prepared by the House Committee on Education and
Labor explains why:
The level of the restriction created by the impairment must be the determining
factor—not the severity of the impairment itself. For example, an individual with
mild mental retardation (intellectual disability) would be considered materially
restricted in the major life activities of learning and thinking. . . . When
considering the condition, manner or duration in which an individual with a
specific learning disability performs a major life activity, it is critical to reject the
assumption that an individual who performs well academically or otherwise
cannot be substantially limited in activities such as learning, reading, writing,
thinking, or speaking. . . . The Committee believes that the comparison of
individuals with specific learning disabilities to “most people” is not problematic
unto itself, but requires a careful analysis of the method and manner in which an
individual’s impairment limits a major life activity. For the majority of the
population, the basic mechanics of reading and writing do not pose extraordinary
lifelong challenges; rather, recognizing and forming letters and words are
effortless, unconscious, automatic processes.
Because specific learning
disabilities are neurologically–based impairments, the process of reading for an
individual with a reading disability (e.g. dyslexia) is word-by-word, and otherwise
cumbersome, painful, deliberate and slow—throughout life.
H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 10-11 (2008).
125. 154 CONG. REC. S8840, S8842 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2008) (Statement of Managers)
(quoting S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 23 (1989)); see also supra note 22.
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of walking if, as a result of a physical impairment, he or she were
only able to walk at an average speed, or even at moderately below
average speed.126
Unlike the ADAAA’s addition of bodily functions to the list of major life
activities, the ADAAA’s take on substantial limitation remains true to the
integrative goals of the ADA. The ADAAA’s approach to substantial
limitation also preserves the ADA’s focus on the abilities of disabled people,
rather than the conditions that make them different from (though not
necessarily less functional than) nondisabled people.
2. The Rejection of Mitigating Measures
The same cannot be said of the ADAAA’s near-wholesale rejection of
considering mitigating measures.127 The poverty of this amendment is made
plain when it is contrasted with the lone exception to the rule: “The
ameliorative effects of the mitigating measures of ordinary eyeglasses or
contact lenses shall be considered in determining whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity.”128 Congress’s rationale for this lone
exception is that “the use of ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses, without
more, is not significant enough to warrant protection under the ADA.”129
Can it be that poor eyesight is the only impairment so remediable as to
justify disqualification as a disability? The same seems true of other
impairments that, at least in their mild forms, can be managed through widely
accessible, effective mitigating measures. Hearing impairments treatable with
hearing aids represent the most sharp and intuitive analogue. But other
conditions treatable with medication or assistive technology—e.g., asthma,
diabetes, hypertension—could also qualify for exception under Congress’s
rationale.
One possible explanation for why Congress singled out vision impairments
is that these impairments have a unique and well-developed factual and legal
history under the ADA. This is because of longstanding vision requirements
for driving and flying positions with federal and state departments of
transportation and private employers.130 The ADAAA’s permission to
126. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(j) app. (2008).
127. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(E)(i), 122
Stat. 3553, 3556 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)) (“The determination of whether
an impairment substantially limits a major life activity shall be made without regard to the
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures . . . .” (emphasis added)).
128. See id. sec. 4(a), § 3(4)(E)(ii), 122 Stat. at 3556 (emphasis added) (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(ii)).
129. 154 CONG. REC. at S8842.
130. The leading cases on the permissibility of vision requirements for certain occupations
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consider mitigating measures with respect to vision impairments probably has
more to do with this history than with the fact that vision is an especially
remediable type of impairment.
But however limiting certain impairments may be in their uncorrected
states, the impairments mentioned above simply are not disabilities in a
practical sense when effective and readily available treatments exist. We do
not prohibit individuals from obtaining driver’s licenses simply because their
uncorrected vision would leave them unfit to be on the roads. They are
allowed to drive upon showing that corrective glasses or lenses give them safe
road vision. They are allowed behind the wheel because, in fact, they are able
to drive safely.
If the consideration of mitigating measures makes sense with regard to
vision impairments, it must also make sense with at least some other
impairments. In fact, it should make sense with any condition whose effects
are neutralized or well controlled with medication or other medical support
(that does not itself create additional hindrances). Diabetes, arthritis, HIV,
asthma, and epilepsy, to name a few, should all cease to be actual disabilities
when so managed.
Furthermore, ignoring evidence of mitigation in assessing level of
restriction except in the context of vision impairments comes at great cost.
First, such ignorance creates an artificially high level of restriction that bears
no true relationship to what an impaired individual is actually able to do in the
way of major life activities. Second, and more important, the policy serves to
exclude essential evidence of functionality. In some cases, the exclusion will
render the element of substantial limitation altogether meaningless. If, in
evaluating an asthmatic or a hearing-impaired person, the law must ignore the
fact that these conditions may be normalized by over-the-counter inhalers and
standard hearing aids, respectively, then the inquiry into substantial limitation
is hollow. In such cases, the “requirement” of substantial limitation is straw;
it is reached by counterfactual inference.
* * *
A caveat: This article contends that the ADAAA’s rejection of mitigating
measures disconnects substantial limitation from an individual’s true
functionality and, therefore, one’s actual (dis)ability. Even before the
are—or were—Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999), and Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec.
2(b)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. at 3554. For more recent examples, see Buboltz v. Residential
Advantages, Inc., 523 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2008); Canny v. Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Bottling Group,
Inc., 439 F.3d 894 (8th Cir. 2006); EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 424 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir.
2005); Shannon v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 332 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2003).
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ADAAA’s passage, however, some scholars disputed whether our disability
law should impose a legal duty to take reasonable care to prevent treatable
conditions from becoming disabilities.131 Whether individuals should carry a
duty to mitigate impairment to prevent disability is related to, but distinct
from, the broader issue of voluntariness as treated in section 902.2(e) of the
EEOC Compliance Manual:
Voluntariness—Voluntariness is irrelevant when determining
whether a condition constitutes an impairment. For example, an
individual who develops lung cancer as a result of smoking has an
impairment, notwithstanding the fact that some apparently
volitional act of the individual may have caused the impairment.
The cause of a condition has no effect on whether that condition is
an impairment. See House Judiciary Report at 29 (noting that
“[t]he cause of a disability is always irrelevant to the determination
of disability”); see also Cook v. Rhode Island Dep't of Mental
Health, Retardation and Hosp., 10 F.3d 17, 63 EPD ¶ 42,673, 2
AD Cas. (BNA) 1476 (1st Cir. 1993). Further, the voluntary use of
a prosthetic device or other mitigating measure to correct or to
lessen the effects of a condition also has no bearing on whether that
condition is an impairment.132
The foregoing rejects denying the law’s protection to individuals whose
poor choices are causally related to their disabilities. If the opposite were the
case, voluntariness would function as an affirmative defense to evidence that
would otherwise establish physical or mental impairment. Voluntariness in
this sense is, and should be, irrelevant to the determination of disability.
This does not, however, preclude in our disability law what might be termed
“a duty to reasonably mitigate impairment.” Pre-ADAAA scholarship relating
to a duty to mitigate severe impairment developed in response to Sutton v.
131. See, e.g., Melissa Cole, The Mitigation Expectation and the Sutton Court’s Closeting
of Disabilities, 43 HOW. L.J. 499 (2000) (characterizing Sutton as creating a repressive
“mitigation expectation” that individuals with disabilities that can be mitigated “closet” them);
Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Requiring Individuals to Use Mitigating Measures in Reasonable
Accommodation Cases After the Sutton Trilogy: Putting the Brakes on a Potential Runaway
Train, 54 S.C. L. REV. 421 (2002) (arguing for a balancing approach to consideration of
mitigating measures in the context of reasonable accommodation, but not in disability
determinations); Sarah Shaw, Comment, Why Courts Cannot Deny ADA Protection to Plaintiffs
Who Do Not Use Available Mitigating Measures for Their Impairments, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1981
(2002) (arguing that neither the ADA nor congressional intent supports such a requirement).
But see Jill Elaine Hasday, Mitigation and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 217 (2004) (advocating the minority position in favor of duties of reasonable mitigation).
132. EEOC, supra note 37, § 902.2(e).
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United Air Lines, Inc.133 Sutton instructed courts to consider mitigating
measures in making disability determinations but did not address what types
of considerations were legally required and/or permissible.134 For example,
consider four closely related causal issues that a court might consider in
making a disability determination:
(1) Whether reasonable mitigating measures actually taken have driven an
impairment below the threshold of substantial limitation or impact on major
life activity;
(2) Whether reasonable mitigating measures, if they had been taken or taken
sooner, would have driven an impairment below the threshold of substantial
limitation or impact on major life activity;
(3) Whether the failure to take reasonable mitigating measures has resulted
in an impairment above the threshold of substantial limitation or impact on
major life activity; and
(4) Whether reasonable mitigating measures, if yet taken, would drive an
impairment below the threshold of substantial limitation or impact on major
life activity.
Although the Sutton court did not address the larger question of whether our
disability law should impose a duty to reasonably mitigate impairment,135 I
believe that a strong presumption exists in favor of just such a duty, and it is
worthwhile to discuss the basis for that presumption. The explanation begins
with the observation that bodies of law whose goal it is to minimize harm
routinely place minor duties of harm prevention on plaintiffs as well as
defendants. In contracts, for example, the doctrine of avoidable consequences
provides that “damages are not recoverable for [economic] loss that the injured
party [reasonably] could have avoided without undue risk, burden or
humiliation.”136 Comparative tort regimes have similar requirements for
mitigation of damages through apportionment rules and doctrines such as “last
clear chance” and fifty- and fifty-one-percent bars to recovery, which
encourage plaintiffs to minimize harm where it is reasonable to do so.137
Likewise, criminal law considers both mitigating and aggravating

133. 527 U.S. 471. Of the scholars writing on this issue, most appear to have viewed the
propriety of any duty of mitigation at the disability determination stage with great skepticism.
See sources cited supra note 131.
134. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-83.
135. See 527 U.S. 471.
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(1) (1981).
137. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIAB. § 7 cmt. a (2000)
(discussing modified comparative fault regimes, which preclude recovery if the plaintiff is fiftyor fifty-one-percent responsible); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 479-80 (1965) (setting
forth two variations of the “last clear chance” rule).
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circumstances as relevant to sentencing and punishment in murder cases.138 To
be sure, the role of mitigation differs in contracts, torts, and criminal law. That
is due, at least in part, to the unique types of harm those bodies of law are
designed to prevent.
Antidiscrimination law, including disability law, also exists to prevent a
particular species of harm—discrimination. Any role for mitigation in this
arena must be refitted to the particular aims of disability law, and mitigation
must function differently than it often has in other areas of law. In contract,
tort, and criminal law, the mitigation duty modifies outcomes (damage awards
and punishments). By contrast, a mitigation duty in disability law would
modify inputs (those elements required to qualify as disabled for purposes of
stating a claim). This is a very different application of the duty to mitigate.
But there is nothing about that fact, standing alone, that requires rejection of
the general principle that the plaintiff’s duty to minimize harm is an integral
feature of antiharm law. Indeed, the introduction of a duty to reasonably
mitigate impairment into disability law seems a logical extension of disability
law, with similar precedents in other areas of antiharm law. Thus, without
particular reasons to question a duty to reasonably mitigate impairment, we
should presume that such a duty could find a comfortable home in disability
law.
Admittedly, the role that mitigation might play in antidiscrimination law is
circumscribed by the immutability of the characteristics (e.g., race, gender,
sexual orientation) on which some class protections are based.139 This means
138. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(3)-(4) (2001).
139. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes it unlawful for an employer
XX(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
XX(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). Also, an increasing number of states include sexual orientation
as a protected class. For example, Oregon recently amended its employment discrimination
statute to add sexual orientation to its list of protected classes:
For an employer, because of an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, sexual
orientation, national origin, marital status or age if the individual is 18 years of
age or older, or because of the race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation,
national origin, marital status or age of any other person with whom the individual
associates, . . . to refuse to hire or employ the individual or to bar or discharge the
individual from employment.
Act of May 9, 2007, ch. 100, § 4, 2007 Or. Laws Spec. Sess. 431, 432 (emphasis added)
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that in many cases, with regard to establishing protected status, the doctrine of
mitigation simply would have no work to do. But it would have a greater role
in disability law because many physical and mental impairments are
mutable—they are affected by the choices we make.140
One way of decreasing the incidence of disability discrimination is to
decrease the overall occurrence of conditions that rise to the level of legal
disability. The asthmatic whose condition is controlled by over-the-counter
inhalers and the vision-restricted person whose vision is restored to 20/20 with
contact lenses are uniquely positioned to take advantage of these opportunities
for mitigation. Determining when such legal opportunities exist—that is, when
a duty to mitigate is truly reasonable as opposed to oppressive or contrary to
the law’s purpose—is hard. But it is a question all antiharm laws must answer,
and the difficulty of arriving at an answer is not a reason for skirting the
inquiry.
* * *
II. Litigation After the ADA Amendments Act
How will the ADAAA affect the litigation of employment-related disability
discrimination claims? How should the ADAAA affect the advice that
employment lawyers give to their clients? This section discusses three major
changes to disability law practice likely to flow from the ADAAA: (1) the shift
in leverage from defendant-employers to plaintiff-employees at the motion to
dismiss and summary judgment stages of litigation, (2) the domino effect that
the ADAAA will likely have on state disability discrimination laws, and (3)
new risks relating to reasonable accommodation.
A. Changes to Summary Judgment
The institutional limitations of the ADA are well documented. To start, the
American Bar Association examined all Title I cases decided between 1992
and 1997 and found that, “[o]f the 760 decisions in which one party or the
other prevailed, employers prevailed in 92.11 percent of those cases, meaning
employees prevailed only 7.89 percent of the time.”141 Additionally, Professor
Ruth Colker conducted two studies of ADA appellate cases between 1992 and

(amending OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.030(1)(a) (2007)).
140. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 15, at 327 (“[T]he ADA acknowledges that individuals’
physical and mental disabilities might pose limitations relevant to job performance.” (citing 42
U.S.C. § 12112 (2000))).
141. Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and Administrative Complaints,
22 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. (ABA) 403, 403-04 (1998).
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1998,142 concluding that defendants prevailed 94% of the time in district courts
and 84% of the time on appeal from district court level losses.143
More recently, Professors Michael Fox and Robert Mead studied appellate
outcomes in ADA Title I cases.144 They divided disabilities into four
categories: acute physical conditions, chronic diseases, cognitive behavioral
conditions, and injuries.145 They further divided their results into cases
decided before and after the Sutton decision.146 Because Sutton and its
progeny “narrowed the definition of disability under the ADA,” some scholars
predicted that those cases would further decrease ADA plaintiffs’ chances of
success.147 To the contrary, Fox and Mead concluded that post-Sutton success
rates for Title I plaintiffs in the courts of appeals increased in all four disability
categories, and by 32% overall.148 These gains remained too low, however, to
signal that the balance had tipped in favor of plaintiffs: “The average
percentage of plaintiff wins in the years 2000–2002 for all conditions
[remained a mere] 33%.”149
Furthermore, after conducting an analysis in 2008, Professor Sharona
Hoffman concluded that “defendants have consistently prevailed in well over
90% of cases since the ADA’s inception.”150 Finally, in its annual survey of
employment law cases brought under the ADA, the American Bar Association
reported that of 507 cases brought in 2008, “415 resulted in employer wins; 9
in employee wins; and 83 in no resolution of the merits. Of the 424 decisions
that resolved the claim (and have not yet changed on appeal), 97.8 percent
resulted in employer wins and 2.2 percent in employee wins.”151

142. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99 (1999) [hereinafter Colker, Windfall for Defendants]; Ruth Colker,
Winning and Losing Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST . L.J. 239 (2001).
143. Colker, Windfall for Defendants, supra note 142, at 107 tbl. 1.
144. Michael H. Fox & Robert A. Mead, The Relationship of Disability to Employment
Protection Under Title I of the ADA in the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal, 13 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 485 (2004).
145. See id. at 497-506 & tbl. 1.
146. See id. at 506 (discussing the impact of Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471
(1999), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec.
2(b)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554, on subsequent appellate court decisions).
147. See id. at 486-87 (noting Professor Colker’s prediction “that the Supreme Court’s 1999
decision[] in Sutton . . . [was] likely to diminish successful employment discrimination lawsuits
for certain types of disabilities”).
148. Id. at 506.
149. Id. at 507 & tbl. 2.
150. Hoffman, supra note 15, at 306.
151. Amy L. Allbright, 2008 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I–Survey Update,
33 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. (ABA) 363, 364 (2009) (emphasis added).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss4/2

2010]

ENFEEBLING THE ADA

693

According to Professor Colker, two factors explain such favorable outcomes
for employers. First is the way courts have used summary judgment in ADA
cases.152 Second, and related, is the refusal by courts in ADA cases to defer to
EEOC interpretations of “disability,” among other things.153 Professor Colker
argues that courts routinely refuse to send the question of whether an
individual is disabled to the jury, treating that issue as a question of law rather
than a question of fact.154 She further contends that courts often incorrectly
allocate the burden of proof at the summary judgment stage, resulting in an
inordinately high threshold for a plaintiff to meet in order to establish genuine
issues of material fact.155
There is other evidence that the low plaintiff win rate in ADA cases is due,
in important part, to the manner in which courts have interpreted the ADA’s
definition of “disability.” Professor Hoffman has argued that many people
who have filed ADA claims have not had “what are traditionally thought of as
severe disabilities”; consequently, a “significant portion” of victorious
individuals might not have been “the most needy or deserving plaintiffs.”156
She has also observed that
[c]ourts often find that a plaintiff is not sufficiently limited to meet
the “substantially limits” requirement or that the constraint in
question affects a narrow area of functionality but not a “major
life” activity. Thus, for example, courts have repeatedly ruled that
individuals with mental retardation do not have a disability because
they are not substantially limited with respect to any major life
activity. Consequently, plaintiffs encounter significant difficulty
convincing the courts that they are entitled to ADA coverage by
virtue of having a “disability.” A plaintiff who does not meet the
threshold requirement of being an individual with a disability under
the ADA will be given no further consideration by the court, and
the questions of whether she should be granted a reasonable
accommodation or is entitled to damages will never be reached.157
The primary effect of the ADAAA will be to remove existence of disability
as a robust summary judgment issue for employers. Courts’ prior refusals to
defer to EEOC interpretations of “disability” were based on the ADA’s failure
152. See Colker, Windfall for Defendants, supra note 142, at 101-02.
153. See id. at 102-03.
154. See id. at 101.
155. Id. at 102.
156. See Sharona Hoffman, Corrective Justice and Title I of the ADA, 52 AM. U. L. REV.
1213, 1250 (2003).
157. Hoffman, supra note 15, at 327-28 (footnotes omitted).
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to expressly grant the Agency the authority to define “disability.”158 The
ADAAA, however, expressly authorizes the EEOC to define “disability” and
orders the Agency to develop a less demanding standard of proof for
establishing the existence of a disability.159
Consequently, the focus of summary judgment will shift from disability
determinations to employer compliance—precisely what the ADAAA was
intended to accomplish.160 The new question will be whether an employee has
presented a genuine issue of material fact regarding the employer’s basis for
an adverse employment decision. Therefore, employers seeking summary
judgment should be prepared with substantial documentation explaining
adverse employment decisions and evidence of compliance with ADA norms,
including proof of staff training and enforcement, just as they would in any
Title VII case.
B. State Antidiscrimination Laws
Many states’ disability discrimination laws are modeled after the ADA.
Several states even require that their disability laws be construed in a manner
consistent with the ADA. Oregon, for example, adopted the ADA’s general
framework with regard to reasonable accommodation, undue hardship,
qualification standards, the definition of “employment discrimination,” illegal
drug use, and medical examinations.161 Oregon also mandates that its
disability discrimination laws “be construed to the extent possible in a manner
that is consistent with any similar provisions of the federal Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, as amended by the federal ADA Amendments Act of
2008 and as otherwise amended.”162 Moreover, Oregon’s definition of
“disability” is the same as the ADAAA’s definition.163
Similarly, Utah law defines “disability” as “a physical or mental disability
as defined and covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.”164
158. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999) (finding that “[n]o
agency . . . has been given authority to issue regulations . . . interpret[ing] the term ‘disability’”
in the ADA), superseded by statute, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec.
2(b)(2)-(3), 122 Stat. 3553, 3554.
159. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, sec. 6(a)(2), § 506, 122 Stat. at 3558 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12205a) (“The authority to issue regulations granted to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission . . . includes the authority to issue regulations
implementing the definitions of disability in section 3 (including rules of construction) and the
definitions in section 4, consistent with the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.”).
160. Id. sec. 2(b)(5), 122 Stat. at 3554; see also supra text accompanying note 7.
161. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659A.103-.145 (2009).
162. Id. § 659A.139.
163. See id. § 659A.104.
164. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34A-5-102(5) (West 2004 & Supp. 2009) (emphasis added).
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Many other states, although not adopting the ADA writ large, have adopted the
ADA’s definition of “disability” in toto165 and require state-law interpretations
consistent with parallel provisions of the ADA166 or require that state-law
protections be construed more broadly than the protections afforded under the
ADA.167 States with such mandates appear poised to revamp their laws to
conform with the ADAAA. This would mean an increase in disability
discrimination cases under state, as well as federal, law.
C. Reasonable Accommodation
Under the ADA, employers have a duty to reasonably accommodate the
known disabilities of employees.168 That duty requires employers to make
adjustments to the workplace that enable qualified individuals with disabilities
to enjoy the same employment opportunities as individuals without disabilities,
provided that such adjustments do not cause an undue hardship to the
165. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(14) (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1461(2)
(2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-301(2.5) (2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 722(4) (2005);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-1401.02(5A) (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-1
(2008 & Supp. 2009); IND. CODE. ANN. § 22-9-5-6(a) (LexisNexis 1997 & Supp. 2008); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 44-1002(j) (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.010(4) (West 2006); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23:322(3) (2010); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 1(17) (LexisNexis 2008); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 213.010(4) (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101(19) (2009); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 48-1102(9) (2004); NEV. REV. STAT . ANN. § 613.310(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2009);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:2(IV) (LexisNexis 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2(M) (West
2003 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 168A-3(7a) (West 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 1402.4-02(5) (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.01(A)(13) (LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2009);
25 OKLA. STAT. § 1301(4) (2001); 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 954(p.1) (West 2009); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-13-30(N) (2005); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 20-13-1(4) (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 421-102(3)(A) (Supp. 2009); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.002(6) (Vernon 2006 & Supp. 2009);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495d(5) (2003); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-3(m) (LexisNexis 2006);
025-140-005 WYO. CODE R. § 2(a) (Weil 2002); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-6(4) (2006)
(excluding consideration of mitigating measures, consistent with the ADAAA).
166. See, e.g., 3 COLO. CODE REGS. § 708-1, Rule 60.1(B)-(C) (2007) (“Whereas the State
law . . . concerning disability is substantially equivalent to Federal law, as set forth in the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the Fair Housing Act concerning disability. . . .
Whenever possible, the interpretation of state law . . . concerning disability shall follow the
interpretations established in Federal regulations adopted to implement the Americans with
Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Act and in the Federal case law interpreting the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Act, and such interpretations shall be
given weight and found to be persuasive in any administrative proceedings.”).
167. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926.1(a)-(d) (West 2005) (declaring that the intent of
the California Legislature in enacting its disability laws was to afford disability protections
broader than those in the ADA); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4554(4) (Supp. 2009) (stating
that Maine’s definition of “physical or mental disability” “is intended to be interpreted broadly
to create greater coverage than under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990”).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006).
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employer.169 The ADAAA does not change the duty of reasonable
accommodation.170 Similarly, the ADAAA does not change the fact that many
accommodations are so obvious, simple, and otherwise unproblematic that
employers may wish to grant them to employees regardless of whether the
employees are legally entitled to them under the ADA.171
Because the ADAAA increases the number and range of physical and
mental impairments that qualify as disabilities, however,172 there will be a
corresponding increase in the number of conditions entitled to workplace
accommodation. This will change the way employers behave—or should
behave—in at least three important ways when employees without obvious
disabilities request a reasonable accommodation. The ADAAA will make the
greatest difference in those cases where an employer chooses to resist a
requested accommodation and a subsequent adverse employment action, such
as demotion or termination, results.
First, the ADAAA’s expanded definition of “disability” includes conditions
such as asthma and diabetes173 that are counterintuitive from a human
resources perspective because they are so easily managed for purposes of full
functionality in the workplace. Thus, human resources personnel must train
themselves on the fact that a much broader range of employee impairments
now triggers the duty of reasonable accommodation and potential ADA
liability. In the absence of clear ADAAA guidance, human resources
personnel may feel compelled to grant seemingly unreasonable
accommodations for dubious disabilities rather than risk protracted and
unpredictable litigation. Therefore, early on it will be crucial for employers
to consult employment law counsel regarding whether particular conditions are
considered disabilities under the new law.
Second, medical verification of disability is likely to play an enhanced role
in reasonable accommodation, especially with respect to major bodily
functions. For example, without detailed medical verification, the employer
in Furnish could have known neither the extent of limitation to the major life
activity of liver function nor how that affected Furnish’s ability to appear and

169. See 29 C.F.R § 1630.9(a) & app. (2008).
170. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 5(a), § 102, 122 Stat.
3553, 3557.
171. According to Professor Sharona Hoffman, “The studies that have been conducted
concerning costs of accommodations reveal that most accommodations involve very modest
direct expenditures or none at all.” Hoffman, supra note 15, at 335. In fact, various studies
place the average cost of making an accommodation for an employee at $500 or less. Id. at
335-36.
172. See discussion supra Part I.B.
173. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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perform at work.174 Employer rights to second opinions and independent
medical evaluations could also be important in cases relating to the extent of
work limitation caused by impaired bodily functions, because these conditions
may qualify as disabilities even when they do not substantially limit major life
activities, as traditionally understood.175
Third, where the defenses of direct threat or undue burden are unavailable,
arguments based on inability to perform essential job functions will likely be
an employer’s best ground for resisting a requested accommodation.176 Recall
that Furnish was terminated for unsatisfactory work performance after he had
fallen behind on his work schedule.177 Had the case been filed after the
ADAAA and Furnish classified as “disabled,” SVI might still have prevailed
by showing that Furnish’s disability prevented him from performing the
essential functions of the job. In Furnish, essential functions could have
included regular attendance,178 particular performance standards such as
number of installations,179 or perhaps the ability to travel.180 The primary
174. Furnish v. SVI Sys., Inc., 270 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2001); see also supra text
accompanying notes 46-63.
175. See discussion supra Part I.B-C.
176. The EEOC defines “essential functions” as “basic job duties that an employee must be
able to perform, with or without reasonable accommodation.” EEOC, THE ADA: YOUR
RESPONSIBILITIES AS AN EMPLOYER, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/ada17.cfm (last
visited May 27, 2010). When an employee’s ability to perform the essential functions of a job
depends on employer accommodation, an employer is only required to accommodate the
employee to the extent that doing so would not result in undue hardship on the employer. See
id. “Undue hardship means that an accommodation would be unduly costly, extensive,
substantial or disruptive, or would fundamentally alter the nature or operation of [the
employer’s] business.” Id. Furthermore, an employer is not obligated to hire or continue the
employment of an employee who, despite reasonable accommodation, poses “a significant risk
of substantial harm” to the health or safety of the employee or others. See id.
177. Furnish, 270 F.3d at 447.
178. See id. (stating that Furnish had missed a work-related meeting). It is well established
under federal case law that regular attendance is an essential job function. See, e.g., Willi v.
Am. Airlines Inc., 288 F. App’x 126, 127 (5th Cir. 2008); Brannon v. Luco Mop Co., 521 F.3d
843, 849 (8th Cir. 2008); Hamm v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 223 F. App’x 506, 508 (7th Cir. 2007).
179. See Furnish, 270 F.3d at 447 (stating that Furnish had fallen behind on his share of the
“hundreds of outstanding installations” SVI had contracted to complete); see also 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(n) app. (2008) (“It is important to note that the inquiry into essential functions is not
intended to second guess an employer’s business judgment with regard to production standards,
whether qualitative or quantitative, nor to require employers to lower such standards. If an
employer requires its typists to be able to accurately type 75 words per minute, it will not be
called upon to explain why an inaccurate work product, or a typing speed of 65 words per
minute, would not be adequate. Similarly, if a hotel requires its service workers to thoroughly
clean 16 rooms per day, it will not have to explain why it requires thorough cleaning, or why
it chose a 16 room rather than a 10 room requirement. However, if an employer does require
accurate 75 word per minute typing or the thorough cleaning of 16 rooms, it will have to show
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impact of the ADAAA on Furnish would only have been to prevent SVI from
prevailing on the basis that Furnish was not disabled.
Employer clarity on essential versus nonessential functions has always been
of fundamental importance under the ADA.181 But after passage of the
ADAAA, employers defending against disability discrimination claims will be
tested on this issue with greater frequency. This means that in assessing
potential ADA claims by employees, employers must evaluate the merits of an
essential-functions argument early on. This will require looking at job
descriptions to determine whether the functions have historically been held
essential, whether and to what extent the functions have been waived or
modified for past employees, etc.
Conclusion: The Devil Left in the Details
In ADA litigation, the determination of disability must be made before
reaching the issue of employer compliance.182 The threshold determination of
disability is necessary because not every physical or mental impairment rises
to the level of legal disability.183
Imagine a circumstance where an employer makes an adverse employment
decision on the basis of an individual’s physical or mental impairment.
Suppose further that the impairment does not prevent the employee from
performing the essential functions of the position, with or without reasonable
accommodation. This is an improper employment decision of the sort that the
ADA was passed to prevent.184 Nevertheless, the employment decision is only
illegal under the ADA if the employee is legally disabled.185
The ADA thus permits, and has always permitted, discrimination on the
basis of physical or mental impairment when employees’ impairments do not
that it actually imposes such requirements on its employees in fact, and not simply on paper.
It should also be noted that, if it is alleged that the employer intentionally selected the particular
level of production to exclude individuals with disabilities, the employer may have to offer a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its selection.” (internal citation omitted)).
180. See Furnish, 270 F.3d at 447 (stating that Furnish notified his supervisor of his inability
to travel to distant installation sites any longer). It is permissible for employers to make
extensive travel an essential job function, but it has proven difficult for plaintiffs to prove that
travel is a major life activity for purposes of establishing disability. See, e.g., Canales v.
Nicholson, 177 F. App’x 834, 840 (10th Cir. 2006); cf. Taylor v. Rice, 451 F.3d 898, 906-07
(D.C. Cir. 2006); Brumbalough v. Camelot Care Ctrs., Inc. 427 F.3d 996, 1004-06 (6th Cir.
2005).
181. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) app.
182. See, e.g., Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist. 197 F.3d 804, 810 (6th Cir. 1999).
183. See discussion supra Part I.B-C.
184. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2006).
185. See id. § 12112(a).
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qualify as legal disabilities. It is immaterial that employers’ intent in such
cases is just as insidious as in cases that do give rise to actionable claims by
disabled employees. Some of the legislative history of the ADAAA reveals
Congress’s confusion on this point:
The Committee understands that many employers do not
discriminate against individuals with disabilities, however, the civil
rights protections of the ADA have been diminished by the
narrowing of the definition of disability, especially in the
workplace. Too often cases have turned solely on the question of
whether the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; too rarely
have courts considered the merits of the discrimination claim, such
as whether adverse decisions were impermissibly made by the
employer on the basis of disability, reasonable accommodations
were denied inappropriately, or qualification standards were
unlawfully discriminatory.186
The confusion in this passage is this: under the structure of the ADA (and
the ADAAA), there is no merit to a disability discrimination claim if the
employee is not legally disabled. This is true even where the employer has
engaged in intentional discrimination against a person who would have had a
viable ADA claim had the person been “disabled” under the ADA. Therefore,
as long as the ADA retains the threshold requirement of disability, it makes no
sense to say that courts have too rarely considered the merits of discrimination
claims. Determinations of disability are part of the merits of such claims.187
In the end, the ADAAA’s enfeeblement of the definition of “disability”
gives all disability discrimination claims more merit. The increased merit,
however, has nothing to do with employer compliance or noncompliance.
Instead, it comes from the fact that many more claimants can now qualify as
disabled.

186. H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 8 (2008) (emphasis added).
187. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, amended by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553; see also Milholland v. Sumner County Bd. of Educ., 569 F.3d
562, 567 (6th Cir. 2009) (“To make a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, [a
plaintiff] must first show that she is ‘a disabled person within the meaning of the Act.’” (quoting
Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist. 197 F.3d 804, 810 (6th Cir. 1999))).
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